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RESUMEN
No todos los europeos emigraron a Estados Unidos. Entre 1879 y 1930
alrededor de 13 millones de europeos fueron a América Latina. Sin
embargo, América Latina no está plenamente incorporada a los debates
actuales sobre costes y beneficios de las migraciones atlánticas. Este artí-
culo presenta un estado de la cuestión de la inmigración en América Lati-
na desde finales del siglo XIX hasta 1930. Evalúa las inferencias realizadas
a partir de la experiencia de los inmigrantes europeos en Estados Unidos
y se cuestiona su validez para el caso latinoamericano. Los temas trata-
dos en la primera sección incluyen las tendencias migratorias y su cro-
nología, el origen nacional de los flujos y la evolución de los salarios rea-
les entre países receptores y emisores. El trabajo presenta nuevos datos
sobre el coste del transporte en la migración internacional. Una segunda
sección examina la contribución de los inmigrantes al crecimiento eco-
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nómico de América Latina, con especial énfasis en el capital humano de
los inmigrantes europeos. El impacto de la inmigración sobre la mano de
obra y la estructura demográfica de los países de inmigración, en el corto
y en el largo plazo, se analiza en la sección siguiente.
Palabras clave: mercado internacional de trabajo, inmigración,
América Latina
ABSTRACT
Not all Europeans migrated to the United States. Between 1879 and
1930 around 13 million of Europeans went to Latin America; however,
Latin America is not fully incorporated into current debates on the cost
and benefits from Atlantic migration. This paper surveys Latin America’s
immigration from the late nineteenth century to 1930. It assesses infe-
rences about European migrants in Latin America derived from the
experience of migrants in the United States and questions its validity.
The topics covered here include migration trends and chronology, natio-
nal origin of the flows and the evolution of real wages. New data on the
cost of passages for transatlantic migration is also presented. This is
followed by an examination of the immigrants’ contribution to economic
growth in Latin America dealing basically with the issue of human capi-
tal brought in by European immigrants. The extent to which immigrants
alter the composition of the labour force and the demographic structu-
re, both in the short and the long run is also examined.
Keywords: international labour market, immigration, Latin America
JEL Classification: J61, N36, N01
INTRODUCTION
The role of Latin America in the international economy has changed
in many ways since the late nineteenth century particularly in relation to
the international labour market. Around 1900, Latin America was an
area of destination for millions of immigrants, mainly Europeans. By the
end of the twentieth century, Latin America had experienced a «popula-
tion explosion» and the region is no longer an area of immigration. On
the contrary, one of the main features of almost all Latin American coun-
tries nowadays is the high volume of emigration to the United States and
Europe.
THE OTHER EUROPEANS: IMMIGRATION INTO LATIN AMERICA AND THE...
397
This paper concentrates on the so called «age of mass migration»,
1870-1930, and will attempt to bring Latin America’s histories of migra-
tion in the Atlantic economy, a history still biased clearly in favour of the
United States Immigration history has been guilty of an «American bias»
even though since the 1960s historians like Frank Thistlethwaite (1960)
and John D. Gould (1979, 1980) called for a comparative approach in
immigration research. The revival of migration studies in the 1990s sho-
wed and effort to integrate countries other than the US, Argentina being
the case in point (Hatton and Williamson, 1998) but the core of the
analysis is still the American experience.
Text books on economic growth in the long run or economic history
in Latin America concentrate on trade and capital and devote only a few
pages to the relationship of Latin American countries with the interna-
tional labour markets. Particularly British historians such as Platt or
Ferns focused their research on trade and capital since those were the
basic links of the British economy with Latin America during the
modern period. Since the British were not a major immigrant groups in
Latin America, they hardly considered the role of foreign labour. For the
colonial period the preferential attention of social scientist is given to
native populations and coerced migration from Africa, and to a much
lesser degree to free immigration. African slaves were part of the world
supply of labour force to Latin America. In terms of immigration alone,
America was an extension of Africa rather than Europe until at least the
mid nineteenth century because the slave trade almost disappeared
after 1850.
Research on European immigration to the Americas since the
Industrial Revolution is constrained by a narrow conception of the
«Atlantic Economy» and literature frequently includes some over-sim-
plifications of the Latin experience during the age of mass migration.
The experiences of Latin American countries are not fully incorporated
into current debates on the cost and benefits from Atlantic migration
despite the fact that 13 million of Europeans migrated to that region bet-
ween 1870 and 1930 (a higher number than to Australia and Canada).
Even the most favoured country by researchers, Argentina, still lags
behind research done for the United States, Australia and Canada.
This paper draws together, in the form of an analytical survey, a num-
ber of different aspects of the Latin America immigration experience
since the late nineteenth century to 1930. Its main objective is to rethink
the role of European migration to Latin America and to clarify some
over-simplifications of the Latin experience during the age of mass
migration.
Section I discusses to what extent Latin America mimics the expe-
rience of the USA focusing on migration trends, national origins of
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1 Discrepancies between numbers recorded by emigration countries and official figures
of immigration countries are a constant in dealing with international migration. Arrival data
are usually higher than departure data. The main source of discrepancies is the definition
of emigrant/immigrant in the official statistics and re-emigration between destination coun-
tries.
2 The distinction between free and coerced labour is important here since Latin Ame-
rica was one of the major participants in the Atlantic slave trade. Klein (1999), Eltis (1983).
immigrants, the evolution of real wages and the costs of passage across
the Atlantic. Did migrants contribute to growth is the question addres-
sed in section II by analysing how much human capital was brought in
by immigrants and how did they adjust to the labour market. The extent
to which immigrants alter the composition of the labour force and the
demographic structure, both in the short and the long run is examined
in section III. A final section concludes.
1. LATIN AMERICA IN THE GLOBAL LABOUR MARKET
Improvements in transport and communication over the nineteenth
century and the progressive elimination of institutional barriers to com-
merce induced an impressive increase in commodity and factor mobility.
About 60 million Europeans migrated to economies of the New World
characterized by scarcities of capital and labour and by cheap and abun-
dant land 1. Not all countries in Latin America suffered from labour scar-
city. Mexico had a relatively large native population and Brazil had both
a large slave and free labour force. Resource abundance with labour
scarcity certainly characterized the River Plate area and the Brazilian
south. Nevertheless, almost all Latin American governments tried to
attract foreign labour to prevent labour shortages in specific sectors of
the national economies and some governments thought that immigra-
tion of culturally «superior» Europeans could contribute to economic
and social modernization.
Ferenczi and Willcox (1929, 1931), document the main trends in
international migration and show that the majority of European immi-
grants went to the United States. Until the last quarter of the nineteenth
century Latin America remained marginal to international market in
free labour 2. Political instability in several new Republics; the low
demand for free labour in the majority of Latin American countries who
possessed either large native populations (Mexico) or used slaves (Brazil
and Cuba); the high cost of the passage; unfavourable geographies and
climates in the hinterland; unattractive political and cultural characte-
ristics; all help to explain why Latin America lagged well behind the
United States as a destination for immigrants.
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3 Brettell (1986) estimates 30-40 per cent of returns to Northern Portugal from all des-
tinations in the early twentieth century.
After 1870 the situation changed. Political stability and the emergen-
ce of policies design to attract foreign immigrants that had been growing
since the 1850s and 1860s including religious freedom, rights of private
ownership and respect for civil rights, friendlier attitudes towards foreig-
ners, all helped. The story is well known: exports rose, capital flows from
Europe came on stream and investment in railways altered prospects for
the exploitation of the regions abundant in natural resources (Bethell,
1986; Bulmer-Thomas, 1994).
Argentina, Brazil after the abolition of slavery, Uruguay and Cuba
were the main destination for foreign labour. More than 90 per cent of
the 13 million European immigrants who travelled to Latin America bet-
ween 1870 and 1930 chose these four countries although modest immi-
gration flows to countries such as Chile, Venezuela or Mexico occurred.
Others like Paraguay or Peru failed almost completely to attract
European immigrants.
Gross figures differ considerably from net immigration supposedly
because one of the main features of European immigration to Latin
America was an exceptional rate of return migration (Gould, 1980).
Sánchez-Albornoz (1986) estimates that between 1892 and 1930 only 46
per cent of immigrants remained permanently in the state of São Paulo
and the same rate is found in Cuba (47 per cent) between 1902 and 1930.
For Argentina it has been calculated that the rate of return was around 53
per cent (Rechini de Lattes and Lattes, 1975). But return migration incre-
ased all over the world from the 1880s onwards. For example an increa-
sing fraction of those who migrated to the United States after 1890 never
intended to remain permanently and returned to their home country.
Return migration to Italy from Argentina and the United States between
1861 and 1914 was 47 per cent and 52 per cent respectively (Gould,
1980) 3. This means that at least half of the Italian emigration to the United
States remained, a low proportion compared to most northern European
countries (notably Germany and Scandinavia) but not much less than the
proportion of English and Welsh emigrants returning in the same period.
According to Baines (1985) around 40 per cent of English emigrants in the
fifty years before the First World War returned and this high rate of return
is found not only from America to England but also from Australia. As
Baines (1991:47) concludes, there may have been lower levels of tempo-
rary migration in the middle of the nineteenth century «because there was
less opportunity to return, not because there was no reason for it».
Net immigration in Argentina over the period 1881-1930 reached 3.8
million. Uruguay attracted nearly 600,000 immigrants during the same
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4 Moya (1998, table 3) presents much higher numbers for Mexico (270,000) since he
includes data from 1880 to 1900. However his figures for Cuba before 1901 are extremely
high since he is using Spanish official data of emigration to Cuba. Spanish emigration data
to the island include, before 1898, a high number of soldiers that can not be, by any means,
classified as immigrants. For an account of the problems of the Spanish emigration statis-
tics, see Sánchez-Alonso (1995), chapter 3.
period. More or less the same number remained in Cuba between 1902
and 1930. Whereas 200,000 people went to Chile only 25,000 immigrants
entered Paraguay and Mexico received less than 18,000 net immigrants
between 1911 and 1924 (Ferenczi and Willcox, 1929) 4.
Table 1 presents immigration rates for the main destination countries
in the New World. The ability of Argentina to attract large numbers of
immigrants relative to its own population is striking not only in the
American context but compares favourably with Australia and Canada.
In 1910-14 foreigners represented 14.5 per cent of total population in the
United States but around 30 per cent of the total population in
Argentina. Prima facie, immigrants could have been more significant for
the development of Argentina than the United States particularly regar-
ding the impact of immigrants upon the receiving country.
European sources of emigration changed over time. In the central
decades of the nineteenth century dominant migratory streams came
from the British Isles, Germany and the Scandinavian countries.
Southern and Eastern Europeans followed in the 1880s (Gould, 1979).
An «emigration life cycle» related to demographic transition, industria-
lization and the «pulls» of a growing stock of previous migrants abroad
developed has been well documented (Hatton and Williamson, 1998,
TABLE 1
NEW WORLD IMMIGRATION RATES BY DECADE
(PER 1,000 MEAN POPULATION)
1871-80 1881-90 1891-1900 1901-10
Argentina 117.0 221.7 163.9 291.8
Uruguay 28.9 25.3 81.6 126.6
Brazil 20.4 41.1 72.3 33.8
Cuba 118.4
United States 54.6 85.8 53.0 102.0
Canada 54.8 78.4 48.8 167.6
Australia 100.4 146.9 7.3 9.9
Sources: For Uruguay calculated from Rial Roade (1980) and Ferenczi and Willcox (1929). For
the rest, Hatton and Williamson (1998) Table 2.2.
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5 Canada could also be included in the «late comer» group but the country had a Domi-
nion status within the British Empire and therefore a different situation in the emigration
market than the Latin-American countries.
6 I am grateful to Tim Dore for this reference and to Bruce Sacerdote for allowing me
to use his unpublished data.
chap. 3). Southern and Eastern European countries entered into the ups-
wing of their emigration cycle in decades prior to World War One.
The question of timing is crucial in the new perspective of analysis
and comparisons presented here. Latin America was a latecomer to the
age of mass migration compared to the United States 5. Yet, immigrants
did not arrive in a vacuum and the experience of pioneers and early net-
works conditioned the assimilation and performance of the followers.
When mass European immigration into Latin America started to flow in
the 1880s, it was clear that the region could not compete with the United
States. Hardly any country of immigration could compete with the
extraordinary attraction of the United States. Over the nineteenth cen-
tury the United States absolutely dominated the European flow.
Europeans from these so called «new emigration countries» had a
wider array of options open to them than those who crossed the Atlantic
in the middle of the nineteenth century. They could, and many did, opt
for the United States, Canada and Australia but Latin American coun-
tries made efforts around these decades to attract European immigrants
as voyages by sea became shorter, safer and cheaper. The significance of
the transport revolution can not be neglected for some countries in Latin
America. The average time taken to travel from Northern Spain to Cuba
in the 1850s was 38 days by sailing vessels; that had decreased to around
19 days in the 1880s and the steamers could do the trip in about 9 to 12
days. On the River Plate route steamers cut the trip from around 55 days
in the mid nineteenth century to 12 days in the 1910s (Moya, 1998 and
Vázquez, 1999). This dramatic reduction in the duration of the Atlantic
crossing effectively reduced the cost of migration when the opportunity
cost of the earning time wasted on board ship is added to the monetary
cost of the trip which was particularly important for the temporary
migrants and contributed decisively to increase the number of workers
travelling to and from the Americas in search of higher wages.
Unfortunately, long-term annual series for transatlantic passage fares
are not available for many European countries, particularly for Southern
Europe.
Table 1 presents some useful data on fares for Spanish emigrants to
their three main destinations and includes (for comparison) fares paid
by British emigrant en route to the United States (Vázquez, 1999;
Sacerdote, 1995) 6. A falling trend for fares to Brazil, Argentina and Cuba
BLANCA SÁNCHEZ ALONSO
402
7 It should be bear in mind that Spanish data refers to prices from Galician ports. The
trip from the Canary Islands to Cuba was cheaper.
is observed from the 1850s onwards. The cheapest fares from Spain were
for voyages to Cuba but remained quite stable over time 7. More expen-
sive fares to Brazil and Argentina in the 1870s and 1880s experienced
sharp declines in the years of massive emigration. According to Cortés
Conde, in the 1880’s an Italian worker could finance his transatlantic trip
with only 20 per cent of his annual income but Spanish emigrants had
to pay for the cost of a passage from incomes of a lower level. For an
agricultural worker from the north of Spain the cost of the trip in the
1880’s (expressed in the number of working days required to pay the
fare) was around 153 working days from a working year of, at most, 250
days (Cortes Conde, 1979; Sánchez-Alonso, 2000a). For northern Italians
it was easier to finance the trip than for Spanish emigrants. In the long
run, remittances and pre-paid tickets sent home by previous generations
of migrants helped to finance the moves of relatives and friends. The
same situation pertained in Italy and Portugal which explains the mas-
sive emigration over the first decade of the twentieth century. Table 2
also documents a convergence between Spanish and British fares in the
first decade of the twentieth century, a period of massive emigration
from Spain, when fares to Latin America moved to levels quite similar to
those from Britain to the United States. Fares from Spanish ports to the
United States in the years 1911-1914 cost $40 compared to $38 to Brazil,
$33 to Argentina and $39 to Cuba (Vázquez, 1999). British emigrants
paid $34 to travel to the United States in the same years. Regression
TABLE 2
TRANSATLANTIC PASSAGE FARES, 1850-1914
(IN CURRENT $)
Spain-Brazil Spain-Argentina Spain-Cuba Britain-USA
1850-1860 n.a 45.18 33.32 44a
1870-1880* 50.71 52.30 36.70 26.55
1881-1890** 45.54 46.60 32.10 20.40
1904-1914*** 31.20 35.19 34.21 33
Sources and notes: Spanish data refer to passages from Galician ports. Vázquez González
(1999). Britain-USA data refer to passages from Liverpool to New York. Sacerdote (1995).
* For Latin American countries, 1872-1880.
** For Spain-Cuba, 1881-1886.
*** For Spain-Brazil, 1906-1914; for Britain-USA, 1904-1912.
a Fares were exceptionally high for the years 1850-1851. Average fare for 1852-1862 were $ 36.9.
THE OTHER EUROPEANS: IMMIGRATION INTO LATIN AMERICA AND THE...
403
8 See the special issue of the Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gese-
lleschaft Lateinamerikas, 13 (1976).
analysis suggests that the roles of migratory networks, the diffusion of
information (or the lack of it for the United States), culture, language
and the existence of long standing colonial links in the case of Cuba
explains to a larger extent the Spaniards’ preference for Latin American
countries than the cost of the travel (Sánchez-Alonso, 2000b).
Latin America derived most of its immigrants mainly from Southern
Europe, although there was also a considerable flow from Central as
well as from East and Southeast European countries in the years prior
to the Great War 8. All of these European regions of departure were coun-
tries of emigration to the United States.
The new and massive waves of immigrants from Southern and
Eastern Europe, who joined the movement since the 1880s were diffe-
rent from those who crossed the Atlantic in the earlier cycles. The tradi-
tional representation in the history of the European migration is that of
migrants travelling with families in the mid-nineteenth century (parti-
cularly to the United States) while workers from the «new emigration»
countries were travelling alone. Three-quarters of the English and
Welsh, two thirds of the Dutch and two-thirds of the Germans who
migrated to the United States in the 1830s were in family groups and a
third of them were children under 15 (Erickson, 1994). In contrast, since
migrants to Latin America were drawn from these «new emigration»
countries in Europe, they were supposed to travel alone in high num-
bers. A large number of immigrants did so but many came in family
units with dependants children. Cuban demands for labour pulled in
more male immigrants travelling alone than Brazil which attracted rela-
tively more families with children than other countries. The Brazilian
immigration policies of subsidizing immigrants’ family groups explain
this pattern. Family groups’ migrating also to Argentina was surprisingly
high. In 1895, 48 per cent of migrants to Argentina arrived as families, a
share that fell to 41 per cent of total immigration in 1913. Some of these
families (especially among the Italians) were dominated by persons of
working age (for example a father and three or four sons) and some
nationalities display stronger tendencies to migrate as families. For
example, since 1900 around 40 per cent of Spanish immigrants to
Argentina came as families. Among the Italians, family groups were more
significant in the nineteenth century and less so in the years before the
War. Spanish families tended moreover to be larger than the Italian
families (3.2 members per Spanish family in 1913 compared to 2.8 of the
Italians and 3 for total immigration (Sánchez-Alonso, 1992). Only 18 per
cent of Spanish immigrants to São Paulo arrived without family in 1908-
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9 Although Germans, Irish and Welsh participated in the colonization process of sou-
thern Brazil and some regions in Argentina those migratory flows to Latin America were
really low compared to the United States.
10 Williamson’s data for real wages seem unreliable for some historians, particularly Bra-
zilian wages. Real wages are computed by Williamson using secondary sources and diffe-
rent estimations available for each country. For example, the Brazilian data comes from Ber-
tola, Calicchio, Camou and Porcile (1999) and it is, in turn, based on research done with
original Brazilian sources. This international database is used extensively in the economic
history literature and allows comparisons between different countries and periods.
1936 compared to 53 per cent of Portuguese arrivals over the same
period (Klein, 1996). The number of migrant children (32 per cent of the
flow) was also higher among Spanish families in Brazil than other natio-
nalities (Portuguese migrant children were 19 per cent). Parts of the
explanation for these variations in migratory strategies arise because
information about different labour markets improved over time.
Spanish families opted for Brazil and Argentina while individual
migrants preferred Cuba where demand for young males was stronger.
The traditional view also stress that high proportions of the «new
immigrants» were illiterates and as common labourers entered into uns-
killed urban occupations rather than agriculture (see section II). They
returned home in high numbers from all the American destinations.
Thus there are no clear differences between late nineteenth century
European emigrants going to the US than those who opted for Latin
American countries. What is different in Latin America is the absence of
those migratory flows from Northern Europe that took place before
1880s but we must not overestimate the differences between emigrants
from northern Europe in the middle of the nineteenth century and from
southern and eastern Europe some forty years later 9.
Why Europeans went to Latin America? Economists have assumed
that wage differentials between home and destination countries explain
migration. Research done by Williamson (1999) allows us to document
levels and movements in annual real wages for a large number of coun-
tries in the world from 1870 onwards 10. His data suggests that during the
years of massive emigration from Europe Latin American countries
could not compete for labour by offering wages at levels offered in the
United States. Within Latin America hardly any country could compete
with the River Plate. Argentina and Uruguay display the highest wage
levels up to 1914 and migrants flowed in higher numbers into Argentina
than into Brazil, Cuba or Uruguay. Wages in Argentina and Uruguay
were systematically more than 200 per cent higher compared to a weigh-
ted average of wages of Italy, Portugal and Spain (Table 3 and Figure 1).
They were over 160 higher in Cuba in the years prior to the Great War,
and were also much higher in Mexico. Mexico never experienced mass
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immigration from Europe. Labour demand and employment opportuni-
ties, not just wage differentials, were also important fundamentals in
explaining immigration patterns.
Brazil, however, represents a puzzle for the traditional explanation of
migration based solely on real wage gaps: wages in Brazil were only 50
TABLE 3
REAL WAGE BY DECADE RELATIVE TO THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES
(WEIGHTED AVERAGE OF ITALY, PORTUGAL AND SPAIN)
Argentina Brazil Colombia Cuba Mexico Uruguay
South East
1850s 35.8
1870s 207.7 48.9 53.1
1890s 267.8 47.5 79.1 173.2 324.8
1909-1913 212.1 47.8 53.1 160.5 140.9 211.5
1930s 201.1 94.4 152.2 63 187
Sources: Williamson (1999). Data are PPP-adjusted Latin American real wages relative to emi-
grating countries in 1913=100. The real wage series for Italy, Portugal and Spain are a weighted ave-
rage of the respective real wage indices calculated by Williamson, where weights used were the 1913
population of these countries.
FIGURE 1
REAL WAGES RELATIVE TO THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES (1913=100)
Sources: The same as Table 3.
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per cent higher than average wage levels in the Mediterranean countries.
Furthermore, Brazil had to compete for labour with Argentina and
Cuba. Subsidies and contract labour in the coffee sector allowed Brazil
to compete for foreign workers. Subsidized immigration allowed poten-
tial emigrants to Brazil to overcome the problems involved in funding
long distance migration. Research has shown that Spanish emigration
was constrained by low levels of income (2000b). In 1911 more than 70
per cent of Spanish immigrants to São Paulo arrived with a subsidized
passage compared to a mere 24 per cent of Portuguese who had stron-
ger links with Brazil (Klein, 1996). Furthermore real advantages of the
colono contract also explain the attraction of Brazil. Coffee workers paid
no rent, either in money, products or labour, in return for some non-
monetary provisions, so generalizations about the colono’s real wages
are difficult to make. Food and rent are always an important part of a
worker’s budget and Holloway (1980) estimates that perhaps 70 per cent
of a colono family’s total income came in the form of free housing, food
crops or pasture lands. The system included the security of a minimum
annual income, low expenses and consequently the possibility of accu-
mulating savings through free housing and cheap food and finally the
possibility of maximizing family income by fully using the labour of all
members of the family. Williamson’s real wages refer to urban unskilled
labour, not to agrarian wages which would have been preferable in the
case of Southern Brazil. Thus, the wage gap is quite irrelevant as an indi-
cator of Brazilian attraction of immigrant families working in the coffee
plantations, but it was important for immigrants that ended up in the
city of São Paulo.
The Brazilian system of subsidizing immigration from Europe is also
at odds with the existence of a large native population. The native
Brazilian population might well have benefited from a reduction in the
supply of unskilled labour from overseas but apparently coffee planters
located in the South East of this vast country preferred to subsidize
immigration from overseas instead of hiring native workers from low
wage areas of Northeast Brazil. Perhaps it was cheaper to pay for trans-
port subsidies for Europeans to cross the Atlantic? Yet it seems unlikely
that transportation cost of bringing workers from the Northeast to the
Southeast of the country exceeded the cost of transporting workers from
Southern Europe to Brazil. Planters had after all done that for two deca-
des after 1850 when slaves where shipped from the less remunerative
sugar zones of north eastern regions to Santos and Rio de Janeiro.
According to Klein (1999) high transport costs, increasingly severe
export taxes and other provincial government restrictions seem to have
curtailed seriously this internal slave trade by the late 1870s and early
1880s. It might be the case that this experience led planters to reject the
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idea of bringing native workers from the Northeast to meet expanding
demands for agricultural workers in the coffee regions. Furthermore,
there is a big difference between shipping slaves (where their will does
not count) and free migration. Most ex-bonded workers —whether they
are slaves in Brazil and the US, mitayos in Andean America, or serfs in
Russia— rarely migrate right after abolition. Long-distance migration
requires all sorts of capital and networks and it takes a generation or two
of freedom to build them.
Native workers from the North were certainly not immobile. Between
1872 and 1910 hundreds of thousands of workers from the Northeast
migrated to the Amazon region (Holloway, 1980). From 1914 through
1929 a quarter of a million native internal migrants passed through the
labour system regulated by the São Paulo government and many others
entered the region without official assistance. For some reason, planters
preferred European immigrants to the peasant mulatto families from
Northeast Brazil. Leff (1982) suggested racial prejudices against native
mulattos, but that seems difficult to test and there is no evidence that
planters in Brazil wished to develop their country on the basis of white
European immigrants (to keep pace with Argentina). On the contrary, a
large group of planters tried, unsuccessfully, to develop a mass immi-
gration recruitment program from China on the eve of slavery abolition
(Conrad, 1975). The Brazilian government finally turned to Japan for a
source of Asian workers in the early decades of the twentieth century.
The huge wage gap between sending regions in Southern Europe and
Latin American economies has led scholars to argue that the latter enjo-
yed the advantages associated by Arthur Lewis (1978) and others with an
unlimited supply of labour. Cortés Conde (1979) and Diaz Alejandro
(1970) also argued that without European immigration the supply of
labour to the Argentinean labour market would have became highly
inelastic and constricting for growth. Leff (1982) observed that the cof-
fee planters in São Paulo benefited from two streams of cheap labour:
first from slaves and thereafter from an inflow of subsidized immigrants.
Immigrant workers from Europe enabled Brazilian planters to maintain
wages at low levels. Output and employment in the export sector of the
economy expanded over the long cycle 1880-1914 at constant real wages
in the coffee plantations.
The Lewis hypothesis concerning the elastic supply of labour from
the Mediterranean countries has been put to the test recently. Hatton
and Williamson (1994) econometric tests show that while wage gaps bet-
ween Southern Europe and Latin certainly influenced emigration, the
elasticities are relatively small. In all three cases (Italy, Spain and
Portugal) a 10 per cent increase in the wage ratio raised emigration by
less than one per thousand in the long run compared with Britain and
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Ireland where long run responses of 2.2 and 2.3 per thousand are obser-
ved. Their results lend little support to the prevalent view in the literatu-
re that the supply of labour from Southern Europe was highly elastic.
The wage gaps may have been large but the elasticities of response seem
to have been seriously constrained by high migration costs for low wage
workers in Southern Europe. However, more detailed research has
shown that emigration was indeed income constrained in Spain and
Italy (Sánchez-Alonso, 2000b and Faini and Venturini, 1994). The unli-
mited supply of labour hypothesis still waits for a careful research par-
ticularly for Brazil which is the more challenging case to test.
Immigrants to Latin America came from latecomer countries to emi-
gration from Europe and were in several respects different from those
who crossed the Atlantic in the early phases of the movement. They were
not, however, different from those Europeans who opted for the United
States in the same period. On balance, the consensus is that Latin
America received poorer and potentially less productive immigrants
than the United States simply because the dominant stream emigrating
from Europe over the years 1880-1914 came from the economically
backward areas of Southern and Eastern Europe. However, these «new
migrants» arrived also to the United States in huge numbers. What is
missing in the Latin American case is the Northern European flows but
is it a question of national origins or of different timing of arrival and to
different receiving societies? If national origins of emigrants from sou-
thern and eastern Europe were roughly the same for immigrants going
to North and South America since the late nineteenth century, why then
immigrants to Latin America are often represented as poor and back-
wards?
2. DID IMMIGRATION CONTRIBUTE TO ECONOMIC GROWTH 
IN LATIN AMERICA IMMIGRATION COUNTRIES?
Among scholars the consensus of opinion reached in the United
States was that the mass immigration of Europeans had, on the whole,
profound positive effects on the rate of growth of the American economy
and on the welfare of resident workers (Carter and Sutch, 1997). Why
such a consensus does not exist in the case of Latin America? Is it becau-
se of the lower number of European immigrants in the region or becau-
se it is assumed that the overall impact was not so positive? Or is it
because we are transferring economic realities of the second half of the
twentieth century to the past?
The exceptionalism of the United States for the history of immigra-
tion merits discussion particularly drawing the limits of comparisons
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with Latin American countries. The United States is different since the
colonial era particularly regarding the obvious fact that the majority of
Spanish America had a large native population. Since the Native
Americans have never been a potent factor in the nation’s history, the
whole history of population in the United States is, at bottom, the story
of the successive waves of immigration (basically from Europe) and of
the adaptation of the new comers. Nothing of the sort happened in
Latin America even in those countries that during the age of mass
migration were preferred destination for European workers. Native
population and African slaves were a basic element in the history of
Latin America. The contrast between a densely populated Europe and
the empty lands in America (a powerful image for potential emigrants)
was not possible between Europe and the majority of countries in Latin
America.
Exceptionalism is also a concept that applies to the extraordinary
economic growth of the US after Independence. The United States dou-
bled Latin America’s product per head in 1820 and trebled it in 1870.
Income gap grew still more after the late nineteenth century (Prados de
la Escosura, 2004). In addition, focusing on the contrast with North
America inevitably leads to a negative assessment of Latin America’s eco-
nomic behaviour. Per capita income divergence between rich (core) and
poor (periphery) countries is the dominant feature of the international
economy in the nineteenth century. All countries lagged behind the
United States during the period 1850-1930.
Immigration countries in Latin America differ from the United States
experience in the comparatively limited number of ethnic groups from
whom the emigrants were drawn. Such a concentration of culturally
homogeneous immigrant groups present and interesting contrast with
the situation in the United States. Immigrants in Latin America (mainly
from Southern Europe) are usually represented as poor, backward and
illiterate 11. This «representation» derives from comparisons of the eco-
nomic backwardness of Italy, Spain and Portugal (measured in terms of
per capita incomes) relative to Great Britain and other advanced coun-
tries in Europe. But were Italian immigrants themselves poorer than
Swedish or Irish immigrants? Were Northern Italians, migrating to
Argentina in the 1880s, more backward than the Irish migrants trave-
lling to USA in the 1860s? Their relative economic qualities will be explo-
red by analysing their occupation and literacy rates and their potential
contribution to economic development in Latin America.
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As usual, these immigrants to Latin America were typically young
adults who carried very high labour participation rates to the receiving
countries. For them (single, unskilled, young adults) the potential bene-
fits from migration would be greater than they would be for the popula-
tion at large, particularly if they embodied lower levels of country-speci-
fic human capital (Hatton and Williamson, 1998). How much did it mat-
ter to have specific human capital in Latin America? If the labour
demand was basically of unskilled labour, why being unskilled was a
negative feature of the immigrants’ supply?
Immigration statistics in receiving countries record the occupation
of immigrants in broad generic terms but immigrants often declared
an occupation that they believed might be welcomed by a host country.
For example, in Cuba the strong pull from the sugar sector explains
why 80 to 90 per cent of immigrants in the first decade of the twentieth
century declared themselves to be hired hands or agricultural workers
(Losada, 1999).
The broad picture which emerges from aggregate statistics is one of
a flow composed overwhelmingly of unskilled rural labour. Even in
Argentina, the most diversified of the host economies, the majority of
arrivals were agricultural workers and day labourers (jornaleros).
Furthermore, the low economic quality of immigrants has been a com-
mon feature of almost all accounts of Brazilian immigration.
Immigrants arrived in São Paulo with the help from subsidized passages
and it is assumed that people who went to Brazil were from the lowest
economic status of the groups migrating to the New World. It has even
been argued that subsidized travel aimed to attract workers so destitute
that they could have no choice but to work on the plantations. Thus,
Brazil obtained «the poorest of the poor» (Merrick and Graham, 1979).
However, the fact that emigrants to Brazil from either Portugal, Spain or
Italy came from the relatively less backward areas of the north of those
countries and not from the poorer south where masses of agricultural
day labourers were allegedly living in miserable conditions casts doubts
on the expression «the poorest of the poor». It could also be argued that
subsidies were a response to the wealth constraint on long distance
migration for large segments of the population in Southern Europe. This
is the argument applied to the indentured servants’ contracts to British
colonial America or to the convict workers transported to Australia in
the early nineteenth century (Grubb, 2003 and Nicholas, 1988).
However, these coerced migrants are not represented in the literature as
ignorant and backward. In the nineteenth century Australia had an assis-
ted migration program, more or less generous according to economic
conditions at home: 50 per cent of arrivals in the 1870s were assisted but
only 10 per cent in the crisis years of the 1890s. Up to 1900 three fourths
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12 In addition, the Italian and the Spanish government banned contract migration to
Brazil. In the early twentieth century Brazilian planters started subsidizing immigration
from Japan.
13 We simply don’t know the extent of stage migration in Southern Europe. The process
is very well documented for some Scandinavian countries but for more urbanized econo-
mies such as England and Wales, Baines (1985) estimated that at least 45 per cent of all
English and Welsh emigrants in the period 1861-1900 must have been both born and brought
up in an urban environment.
of immigrants arriving to São Paulo were subsidized but from 1905 to
1929 spontaneous immigration surpassed by far subsidized immigration
to Brazil. In the 1910s these non-subsidized European immigrants went
more to the city of São Paulo than to the coffee areas 12. Governments in
remote countries had little choice but to subsidize the cost of the passa-
ge if they wanted to attract immigrants but that does not imply that
assisted migrants were, by definition, illiterate and backward.
Furthermore, in analyzing the characteristics of migrants’ distinc-
tions between sectors such as agriculture, commerce or industry may be
analytically rather meaningless for two main reasons. First, in their
countries of origin the majority of European active populations were
employed in agriculture. In 1911, 60 per cent of the male labour force in
Italy was still engaged in the primary sector and the majority of unski-
lled labour, no matter what their designation in the statistics, in fact
lived in rural areas. Higher percentages of employment in agriculture
and lower rates of urbanization are found in Spain, Portugal and other
countries of origin of immigrants to Latin America. It would have been
surprising that European emigrants to Latin America from Southern
and Eastern Europe included lower percentages of agricultural and rural
workers than the populations of their countries of origin 13. Second,
since immigrants often change country and occupation at the same time,
especially when they are young, it is not clear whether the occupational
information of immigrants on arrival is a useful indicator of their sub-
sequent contribution to economic growth. Thus, there are two separable
questions: (i) what did an immigrant bring from home? and (ii) what did
he/she acquire in the Americas? In spite of that, Hatton and Williamson
(2005) stress that the increasing importance of less industrial Eastern
and Southern Europe as an emigrant source served to raise the immi-
grant proportion that was of rural origin and to lower their average skills
and literacy. Is the later an accurate picture of immigrants to Latin
America?
Censuses provide a rough portrayal of the adjustment of immigrants
to host labour markets. Not all Latin American censuses register popu-
lation by nationality or country of origin and usually it is impossible to
obtain information on second generation immigrants, to distinguish per-
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Aires, proved so useful.
15 Urbanizations rates were 27, 12 and 17 per cent in Italy, Portugal and Spain respec-
tively. On the role of European immigration in reversing the urban rank in the New World
see Moya (2006).
manent from temporary immigrants and on their length of residence in
the country. Length of stay provides crucial information for any analysis
of social mobility. For example, Spanish families resident in the city of
Buenos Aires in 1895 worked in low wage occupations but they had been
there less than 5 years and a majority had arrived in the late 1880’s when
the Argentinean government paid for the travel expenses (Sánchez-
Alonso, 1992). Given time immigrants acquired skills and took advanta-
ge of local labour markets 14.
Population censuses suggest that immigration to Latin America con-
tributed decisively to the urban labour force formation in commerce,
industry, building, domestic service and general unskilled labour force.
In some countries, some immigrants were successful in becoming
owners of industries or commercial enterprises. Even if the goal of
many immigrants had been to work on the land, post hoc and for a
majority migration turned out to be a large range transatlantic move
from rural to urban occupations. The highest concentration of immi-
grants in urban population was found in the River Plate countries.
Immigration contributed significantly to urbanization in Latin America
(Bourdé, 1974; Scobie, 1986). In 1910 countries attracting immigrants
also had the highest percentages of their population living in towns with
20,000 or more inhabitants: Argentina 28 per cent, Uruguay 30 and
Cuba 28 per cent, compared to the 10 per cent ratio for Mexico.
Exceptions to this trend included Brazil with a low rate of urbanization
(12 per cent) and Chile with a high urbanization rate (23 per cent)
although immigration was lower than in Brazil. In Southern cone coun-
tries rates of urbanization were actually higher than rates for the coun-
tries of immigrants and similar to the United States (31 per cent) (Flora,
1973; Mitchell, 1993) 15. Some historians explain the concentration of
immigrants in urban activities in Latin America as the outcome of land
settlement policies controlled and restricted by a native wealthy oli-
garchy in sharp contrast with what happened in the United States
(Engerman and Sokoloff, 2005; Solberg, 1987, among others). This ste-
reotype can be rejected and clarified for some countries. For example,
Argentina had an open market in land and many more immigrants than
is generally believed became farmers (Miguez, 1993; Taylor, 1997;
Adelman, 1994). On the Pampas immigrants (particularly Italians)
opted to remain as tenants or share-croppers —a rational choice given
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per cent) reflects the weight of the Spanish banks in the island years before the Indepen-
dence (Maluquer de Motes, 1992).
their lack of capital and knowledge of a new environment and cultiva-
tion system (Gallo, 1983). Both the time of arrival and the existence of
colonial links help to account for differential access to the land. Italians
were the most successful in acquiring land in Argentina because they
were the pioneer group in the era of mass migration. In the 1880s the
proportion of Italian arrivals compared to Spaniards were 14 to 1. When
massive Spanish immigration to the country reached its peak in the
years prior to the Great War Argentina was already more urban than the
country had been in the 1880s and there were more opportunities to
maximize the wage differentials working in the cities than in agricultu-
re (or seasonally in the two sectors).
The colonial links of Portuguese settlers with Brazil and Spaniards
with Cuba till 1898, explain why immigrants concentrated in the urban
and commercial cities like Rio de Janeiro or Havana and not in the rural
sector 16. Linguistic advantages and established connections with local
commercial networks reinforced such trends. Although Spanish immi-
grants in Mexico barely reached 0.2 per cent of Mexican population in
1910, their influence in the creation of Mexican industries, business and
commercial enterprises has led Mexican historians to define this mi-
nority as «privileged immigrants» (Lida, 1994). During the Porfiriato
Spaniards belonged to the upper middle class in the main cities of the
country. By 1930 only 3 per cent of the Spaniards living in Mexico were
engaged in agriculture but were decidedly influential in the Mexican
business sector.
Southern European immigrants to Latin American countries were
generally over-represented in commercial activities in urban centres.
Given high rates of return migration and considering that a high pro-
portion of migrants never intended to settle permanently in the receiving
country, what might low representation among landowners imply?
Research shows that the main goal of emigrants from Southern Europe
was indeed to buy land but in countries of origin (Cinel, 1991; Costa
Leite, 1993).
The representation of immigrants to Latin America as «low quality»
labour comes from comparisons carried out within the United States
labour market that contrast «old» immigrants coming from Northern
Europe and «new» immigrants from Southern and Eastern European
countries. But that representation does not pertain to comparisons bet-
ween Italians in Argentina and in the United States. Italian integration
and mobility in the two societies differed markedly. The United States
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table 15, 1907-1910.
18 Data might also reflect the general upward trend in Spanish literacy in the 1920s.
received a larger group of unskilled and illiterate day labourers from the
South of Italy while Argentina received the more qualified and literate
immigrants from the North. Italians who chose Buenos Aires as their
destination generally achieved greater economic and social success than
those who went to New York (Baily, 1999; Klein, 1983).
Literacy has been frequently used as an indicator of the low quality
of the immigrants in Latin America (Cipolla, 1969). Since literacy rates
were lower in sending countries than for Northern European immi-
grants to the United States, particularly Scandinavia, the general view
that emerges from the comparison with Australia, Canada and the
United States is of a relatively illiterate migratory flow to Latin America.
This picture is broadly the case but needs to be qualified.
Southern and Eastern European immigrants to the United States
showed the same low rates of literacy than those who migrated to Latin
America (or even lower like the Southern Italians case). Argentinean sta-
tistics show that 40 per cent of immigrants arriving in the peak years,
1880-1886 were illiterate. In 1914, a year of massive arrivals, the per-
centage had slightly increased to 42 whereas after the Great War it was
much lower (18 per cent). In the United States, 38 per cent of Southern
and Eastern European immigrants arriving between 1899 and 1910 were
illiterate, a percentage not very different than in Argentina 17. Since
Argentina received masses of immigrants it might be assumed that their
literacy level was lower than more selective flows. However, the most
diversified and urban economy of Argentina might a priori have attrac-
ted more literate immigrants than other Latin American countries. The
latter seems not to be the case. Only 34 per cent of immigrants older
than 7 who arrived to the port of Santos in Brazil between 1908 and 1936
were illiterate. In the 1920s the percentage of illiterates for the native
born population of São Paulo State were 73 per cent (Klein, 1996).
Literate Spanish immigrants were to be found in Cuba before 1898
because of the colonial status of the island. But Cuba continued to
attract literate Spaniards even after Independence. Thus the proportion
of literate Spanish immigrants arriving on the island ranged from 63 per
cent in 1912 to 94 in 1924 (Losada, 1999). Even with a high demand for
unskilled labour on the sugar plantations the percentage of literates
among Spanish immigrants increased 18.
According to Argentinean population census only 26 per cent of
Spaniards over the age of seven living in Argentina were illiterate in 1914
compared to 50 per cent of the total Spanish population in 1910.
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Illiteracy rates in Italy were 38 per cent in 1911, a percentage similar to
that of the Italians living in Argentina. In Portugal nearly 70 per cent of
population was illiterate in 1910 compared with only 52 per cent of
Portuguese immigrants to São Paulo.
Table 4 presents a different picture of literacy rates for Italian and
Spanish immigrants in Argentina before 1895. Data refers to a random
sample from the original census of immigrants residents in Argentina in
the census year 19. Significant differences are observed between rural and
urban immigrants and in both cases between men and women. The ove-
rall picture is, for the two nationalities, one of extraordinary high lite-
racy rates, particularly for Spanish male immigrants; these rates are cer-
tainly much higher than the populations of origin and also higher than
those reported for Southern Europeans immigrants to the United States
by O’Rourke and Williamson (1997).
The issue is whether the proportion of immigrants possessing some
levels of literacy was higher than those who remained at home, that is,
if migrants were positively selected. Given the selectivity of migrants by
age distribution and given the concentration of Southern Europeans
emigrants from few regions, the comparison of immigrants’ literacy
rates with overall rates of residents is inadequate. In the three main
TABLE 4
ARGENTINA 1895. LITERACY RATES (PER CENT)
POPULATION OLDER THAN 7 YEARS OLD
A) Italians
Urban Rural
Males Females Males Females
77.95 66.51 66.96 56.44
n=3202 n=2010 n=775 n=388
B) Spaniards
Urban Rural
Males Females Males Females
87.85 68.65 76.96 56.44
n=2380 n=1340 n=465 n=235
Sources: Random sample of the original files from the 1895 census. Archivo General de la
Nación. Population Census 1895. Archival files num. 466 to 584 and 800 to 1041.
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European countries of origin, the northern regions from where the
majority of immigrants were drawn tended to be more literate than
other parts of the country, particularly in the Italian case. But in Italy the
selectivity of the transatlantic migratory flow seems to have been lower
than in other countries: the larger the migratory flow the closer the typi-
cal emigrant would be to the average population of origin. When immi-
grant’s literacy is compared to literacy rates of potential emigrants from
regions of high emigration the selectivity of the process appears quite
clear for Spain and Portugal (Sánchez Alonso, 1995; Costa Leite, 1993).
The evidence suggests that Southern Europe lost human capital to Latin
America.
Another relevant issue is whether immigrants contributed to raise
literacy levels in Latin America. The literacy levels of immigrants can be
compared to those of native populations in Latin American receiving
countries. Not all governments made the same effort to raise levels of
education, but the data show that those countries with the smallest nati-
ve populations around 1850 and the largest inflows of European immi-
grants displayed the lowest illiteracy rates in the early twentieth century
(Table 5).
TABLE 5
RATES OF ILLITERACY
(PER CENT POPULATION WHICH CAN NEITHER READ OR WRITE*)
1870 1890 1910 1930
Argentina 75-80 55-60 35-40 23-28
Brazil 75-80 64-66 58-62
Chile 70-80 60-65 45-50 24
Cuba 70-75 60-65 40-45 28,2
Mexico 80-85 72.3 61.5
United States 20 13.3 7.7 4.3
Uruguay 20-30 15-25
Canada 25 13.8 5-10 4.3
Australia 17.9 11.3 4.5 1-5
Italy 69 54-56 39.3 23.1
Portugal 75-80 68.9 60.2
Spain 65-70 61 52.2 30-35
Sources: Flora (1973) based on national censuses.
* Population above 15 years old.
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Latin American rankings are led by Uruguay (25 per cent of illitera-
tes in 1908). Argentina had 38 per cent of illiterates whereas Chile, with
much lower immigration rates than the River Plate region, had a 50 per
cent of illiteracy rate in the 1910s. Mexico’s illiteracy rate was 72 per cent
of the population, higher than Brazil and Cuba with high proportions of
population of African origin. These rates are certainly low compared to
literacy rates for the same period for the United States, Canada and
Australia. Immigrants raised literacy levels in some Latin American
countries but other forces mattered more, particularly political commit-
ment and taxes allocated to improve educational levels among their
populations.
Did immigration add special skills or entrepreneurial capacities to
the local labour force? Immigrants seem to have been over-represented
among proprietors of industrial and commercial firms. They also con-
tributed importantly to the formation of industrial and urban workfor-
ces. Immigrants in Argentina and Brazil accounted for disproportiona-
tely large shares of the workers in São Paulo and Buenos Aires manu-
facturing industries. Argentinean historians find immigrants played a
positive role. Germani (1955) was among many historians to stress the
modernizing role of immigrants and their exceptional contribution to
the development of an entrepreneurial class in Argentina. But, accor-
ding to Landes (1998: p. 321) Argentina selected underemployed pea-
sants of little skills and education whose potential contribution to the
economy was limited. For Brazil, Dean (1969) has argued that in the
Southeast immigrants and their children played an important role as
entrepreneurs in the industrialization in São Paulo and for the moder-
nization of the rural sector. Leff (1997) disagrees and argues that immi-
gration was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to promote
development. Leff believes that if overseas immigrants had not been
available, that supply of labour to fill the growing demand of industrial
workers in São Paulo could have come from domestic sources. This is,
however, a very difficult counterfactual to test. On the whole European
workers retained a good reputation as workers both in the agricultural
and the industrial labour forces. All reports from Brazil, Argentina, and
Cuba concerning the productivity of Italians, Spaniards and Portuguese
immigrants stress the fact that they were hard-working, sober and well-
behaved. In contrast, the United States Immigration Commission con-
cluded in 1911 that the «new» immigrants were «far less intelligent»
than the «old» immigrants (Quoted in Hatton and Williamson 1998,
chap. 7).
No general conclusion can be drawn about the role of immigrants
in supplying entrepreneurial and other skills or about contributions to
the growth of internal demand. Positive representations are there in
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histories of Argentina and Uruguay. Immigrants did supply business-
men for Mexico and Chile but in the cases of Cuba and Brazil, immi-
gration cannot be credited with such an impact. Immigrants to Latin
America from Southern Europe were positively selected by literacy and
they carried higher literacy rates than native populations. On the
whole, Latin America benefited clearly from European immigration.
This does not imply that European immigrants were the key variable
explaining economic growth before the 1930s. Those countries with
the highest immigration rate displayed fast economic growth but
policy, institutional stability, foreign capital and trade also played a
crucial role.
3. WAS IMMIGRATION A DEMOGRAPHIC GIFT
OR A DEMOGRAPHIC BURDEN?
Immigrants who settled permanently in Latin America contributed
to the growth of the population over the long run. This was especially
true for countries like Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil. In the 1880s
almost 26 per cent of total population growth in Argentina was due to
immigration. Over the next period, 1891-1910 the share fell to14 per
cent and down to 9 per cent in the 1920s. In 1901-1920 immigration was
responsible for only 7 per cent of Brazilian population growth but in the
years of high immigration, 1891-1900, the share was a spectacular 30
per cent.
Immigration affects the overall rate of population growth by increa-
sing absolute numbers and numbers of young people having children. It
also has a direct impact on the age structure of the population.
Migration is a highly selective process by age. In the short run, immi-
grants increase participation rates and contribute to the growth of the
labour force, but in the long run the age structure of the population
changes as the population grows. In recent years the debate on the
influence of demography on economic growth has shifted the emphasis
from population size and growth to age structures (Bloom, Canning and
Sevilla, 2002). People’s economic behaviour varies at different stages of
their life cycles. Thus, changes in a country’s age structure can have sig-
nificant effects on economic performance. Economic growth and popu-
lation growth are related by modifications to the age structures of popu-
lations passing through demographic transitions. Dividing the popula-
tion in three age groups, two dependants (the young and the old) and
one economically active, each age group in a population exhibits diffe-
rent patterns of demand and savings. Children require intensive inves-
tment in health and education, prime-age adults supply labour and
THE OTHER EUROPEANS: IMMIGRATION INTO LATIN AMERICA AND THE...
419
savings, and the elderly require expenditures upon health and retirement
benefits (Coale and Hoover, 1958; Kelley, 1988).
Did immigration into Latin America increase the working age group
and thereby produce a «demographic gift» for economic growth?
Although policies to take advantage of this «gift» have to be implemen-
ted, immigrants are «ready-to-use» working population and lower the
volume of resources devoted to the care of children. But immigrants as
young adults also increase the number of dependents since they have
and raise children in the host country hence creating a «demographic
burden». Thus, it is important to measure the overall demographic effect
of immigration in Latin America.
Immigrants contributed to the labour force growth and in the absen-
ce of immigration labour costs would have been higher. O’Rourke and
Williamson (1999) have estimated that in 1910 real wages would have
been 46 per cent higher in Argentina without immigration. The Brazilian
case is not so advantageous. Real wages would apparently have been
only 2 per cent higher in 1910 in the absence of mass migration. A lar-
ger labour force only becomes a gain when extra workers find jobs.
Since immigrants left for Latin America because of the availability of
jobs (and higher wages) we can assume that, in the short run, the majo-
rity of immigrants of working age recorded in population censuses in the
receiving countries contributed to economic growth. Since population
as a whole grows more slowly than active population, output per capita
increased faster than output per worker.
Young permanent immigrants might also have raised birth rates and
increased dependency burdens. Did countries of immigration have hig-
her birth rates because of the arrival of young population? Or did immi-
grants contribute to an early start of the demographic transition by
lowering birth rates? Already in 1895 the average number of children in
Argentina was 8.4 for natives born and 6.1 for foreign born women, but
most of differences can be explained by location (urban or rural) and
literacy levels. By 1947 figures were 3.6 children per native woman com-
pared to 3.2 for foreign females (Rechini de Lattes and Lattes, 1975).
Immigrants tend generally to converge to the demographic patterns of
the host society; in the Argentinean case both native and foreign women
seem to have converged to lower birth rates simultaneously. Populations
that experienced rapid rate of increase in per capita income generally
have lower mortality and lower fertility than those where per capita
income grew more slowly. Sánchez Albornoz (1986) argued that the high
birth rates of Latin America can be related to the large shares of popu-
lations that remained rural and that only developed and open societies
had entered the first phase of the demographic transition by the first
quarter of the twentieth century. Demographic transition seems then
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more related to structural changes than to the arrival of European
immigrants.
In balance, immigrants contributed significantly to the growth of
work forces. It seems clear that Argentina, Uruguay and several other
countries in the New World, derived economic advantage from immi-
gration simply because the economically active population grew faster
than the dependant populations in the years between 1870 and 1913.
However, this positive contribution may have been offset by accelerated
population growth over the long run. For example, according to Taylor
(1992; 1994) high rates of immigration and more fecund immigrants to
Argentina compared to Australia increased the dependent population
group, depressed savings, inhibited capital deepening and retarded eco-
nomic growth. During the Belle Époque capital imports maintained the
level of output per worker but in the interwar years when foreign inves-
tment declined Argentina suffered from low domestic savings capacity, a
function of high dependency burdens due to previous waves of pre-war
immigration. The ratios of dependent population (0-15 age group plus
those older than 64) to active population, were already higher in 1914
than dependency rates in Canada, Australia and the United States. In the
1940s those rates were however similar to those found in Canada but
still higher than Australian and the United States.
Table 6 presents dependency rates in Latin America both for massive
immigration countries and low immigration countries like Chile. In the
late nineteenth century, Cuba had the lowest dependency rates.
Argentina and Chile, with very different experiences with immigration
had similar dependency rates, while Mexico and Uruguay had the hig-
hest. In the first decade of the twentieth century, Argentina had the
lowest dependency rate attributable to the rapid increase of working age
population due to immigration. Brazilian immigration policy which
favoured family arrivals could have contributed to the rise in the depen-
dency rate. But in Cuba, where immigration from Europe was predomi-
nately male immigration with no children, native population growth and
perhaps the influx of Caribbean immigrants increased the dependency
rate notably. The Argentine tendency of decreasing the dependency rate
is clear in 1947. Even in the 1940s when the demographic transition was
on its way in more Latin American countries that in the preceding
period, Argentina clearly had the lowest dependency rates of all.
The idea of the demographic burden in Argentina depends entirely on
the basis of the comparison. Within Latin America Argentina and
Uruguay, the highest recipients of Southern European immigrants, had
the lowest dependency rates since the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury. Several forces (other than immigration) appeared to raise burdens
of dependency in Latin America.
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CONCLUSIONS
The global economy evolved slowly through the nineteenth century.
Voluntary migration flows reached their highest levels in the early deca-
des of the twentieth century. Latin American countries like Argentina,
Uruguay, Cuba and Brazil participated actively in the international
labour market. Several other countries in the region, remained, however,
outside this market.
The experiences of Latin American countries are not fully incorpora-
ted into current debates on the cost and benefits from Atlantic migration
despite the fact that 13 million of Europeans migrated to that region bet-
ween 1870 and 1930. Latin America was a late comer to the age of mass
migration. Migratory flows only became really large and significant in
TABLE 6
DEPENDENCY RATES: LATIN AMERICA AND OTHER NEW WORLD
COUNTRIES (1872-1947)
Countries
Argentina 1869 1895 1914 1947
0.839 0.734 0.688 0.533
Brazil 1872 1890 1900 1920 1940
0.719 0.755 0.907 0.880 0.815
Cuba 1889 1907 1919 1943
0.643* 0.698* 0.891* 0.660
Uruguay 1900 1908
0.854* 0.777
Mexico 1895 1900 1910 1930 1940
0.813* 0.805* 0.801 0.802* 0.796
Chile 1895 1907 1920 1930
0.772 0.784* 0.702 0.685
Canada 1871 1891 1911 1921 1931 1941
0.883 0.692 0.600 0.645 0.598 0.526
Australia 1861 1891 1901 1911 1921 1933 1947
0.610 0.666 0.643 0.520 0.567 0.500 0.496
US 1870 1880 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940
0.754 0.686 0.632 0.547 0.573 0.533 0.488
* Age group (15-60).
The dependency rate is the ratio of dependent population (ages 0-15) + (over 64) to potentially
active population (ages 15-64).
Sources: Calculated from Mitchell (1993) and (1983).
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the early years of the twentieth century prior to World War One and the
international labour market changed dramatically after the War. When
mass European immigration to Latin America started in the 1880s, it
was clear that the region could not compete with the United States.
European immigration to Latin America from the 1880s onwards
presents us with similar patterns to those of other parts of the Americas
and Australia. The same economic and demographic forces operated
between sending and receiving regions in the Latin American segment
of the international labour market. Immigrants to Latin America also
came from latecomer countries to emigration from Europe and were in
several respects different from those who crossed the Atlantic in early
phases of the movement. On balance, Latin America received poorer
and potentially less productive immigrants than the United States
simply because the dominant stream emigrating from Europe over the
years 1880-1914 came from the economically backward areas of
Southern and Eastern Europe. But these migrants arrived also to the
United States. Yet their adjustment to the host labour markets in Latin
America seems to have been quite successful particularly in urban sec-
tors but future analysis will wish to distinguish between first and second
generation of immigrants. Furthermore qualifications can be made
about the prevailing representation of immigrants in Latin America as
unskilled, illiterate and low productive labour. Immigrants made ratio-
nal choices of where to go. They went to places where their handicaps
(in language, education and literacy) would be minimized because
demands for unskilled labour were high. Lacking of specific skills may
have been an advantage in the adaptation process to new urban labour
markets. Rates of literacy were certainly lower among Latin American
immigrants than Northern European emigrants going to the United
States, Canada and Australia. However, migrants to Latin America were
positively selected from their countries of origin, particularly in the
Iberian Peninsula, according to literacy. Further more, immigrants had
higher literacy rates than the native populations of Latin America and
countries with the smallest native population around 1870 and the lar-
gest inflow of European immigrants, showed the highest literacy rates
around 1910.
Immigration had an impact on labour force and population growth.
Migrants raised the dependent age groups in the population, particularly
children, in the medium and long run. Since the debate on the influen-
ce of demography on economic growth has shifted the emphasis from
population size and growth to the economic consequences of the age
structure of the population, the long run impact of large numbers of
young immigrants to Latin American countries, other than Argentina,
waits for a promising research.
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Migration history is clearly biased in favour of the United States. It is
dominated by a narrow conception of the «Atlantic Economy» and when
dealing with Latin America is still full of over-simplifications. This paper
has aimed to qualify some of the traditional representations. To consider
migrants other than the Europeans should be the next step in the global
history of migration in Latin America.
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